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Abstract In this study we use a N-person differential game structure to represent a
renewable resource industry in which the decision agents are few in number and
noncooperative (as would be the case, for example, in intemational fishing wars). As
an illustration we assume an environment similar to that presented by Levhari and
Mirman (1980) to derive a set of tractable strategies. Although there is no guarantee
that the stock size would always be positive with human harvesting in the Levhari and
Mirman case, our model provides growth dynamics that rule out negative stocks.
Explicit solutions of equilibrium game strategies and a steady-state level of stock are
derived. Finally, we demonstrate that in situations when stock size enters the
production Junction, combined maximization such as an intemational treaty is more
"conservative" than individual maximization.
Introduction
Fishing is one of the oldest commercial production activities. Since its natural resource
base is generally of open access, rules and institutions have evolved to settle territorial
disputes or in some way to legislate fairness of exploitation. Sometimes such rules have
been responses to efficiency needs, sometimes to equity problems.
For example, in the early development of the Northern Atlantic fishery, it was de-
creed that it would be illegal to develop year-round fishing communities in Newfound-
land since those residents would have an "unfair advantage" in harvesting the cod
stock.' Similarly, fishing traditions evolved in the whaling and fishing industry to estab-
lish rules of fair play.
More recently, quota rules were established by joint agreement for fish stock man-
agement. For instance, the North Atlantic was divided into well-defined regions by
ICNAF^ with rules and quotas in each region.
Such institutional arrangements represented two established propositions of eco-
nomic analysis. The first was that fish stock management was essential to maximize
social welfare (or social rents), and the second was that joint maximization (or colluded
settlement) was resource conserving.
The introduction of 200-mile territorial limits defining fishing property rights caused
existing sharing arrangements to expire and resulted in territorial disputes over fishing
jurisdiction. These disputes occur where territorial boundaries overlap such as in the
Georges Bank between the United States and Canada, and in 1987 between Canada and
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France when the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, a few miles off the New-
foundland coast, claimed extended fishing rights.
In such territorial disputes, cooperative solutions are generally sought that are Pareto
optimal equilibria (see Lewis and Cowens 1982; Kaitala et al. 1985; Munro 1979). As
an example, an international commission recently settled the territorial dispute between
the United States and Canada over the Georges Bank.
However, the possibility of noncooperation exists. At the present time, Canada and
France have not been able to agree on a settlement of their territorial struggle in the
Atlantic. Such a situation would be modeled as a noncooperative differential game, or
"fish war" as in Levhari and Mirman (1980).
To be more specific about the environment of our model, there are assumed to be two
(or more) agents who intend to harvest an intemational fish stock. Each has complete
information concerning the size and dynamics of this stock and the set of harvesting
strategies available to other agent(s). Each fishing country is aware that whatever stock
it does not harvest may or may not be available for further growth and harvesting
depending upon the harvesting decision(s) of the other fishing countries. Since each
country must choose its harvest plan (or strategy) without knowledge of which strategy
the other (competing) harvester(s) will choose, the scenario defines a "game." The
outcome depends upon each country's harvesting action. Moreover, the accumulated
harvest of all agents at any one time will determine the size of the remaining resource
and hence the availability of stock for all future harvests. Hence the game is dynamic.
The only "strategy" available in this game is the choice of harvesting effort. Each
country will choose its harvesting rate at time tj (as part of its intertemporal optimizing
strategy) in such a way as to maximize its objective (such as the satisfaction it achieves
from selling the harvest), but subject to the effect its catch will have on the stock
dynamics, while taking full account of the assumed known harvesting effects that the
other countries will have on the stock dynamics. Moreover, its harvesting strategy
should display dynamic optimality (or equivalendy subgame perfection) in the following
sense: at initial time t^ it chooses not only its harvesting rate for that period, but its
complete strategy, which consists of harvesting rates for all subsequent periods. Of
course, at some later time tj, it could adopt a different harvesting rate from
that previously chosen for period tj, but dynamic optimality requires that there is
never any reason to do so. Such strategy is often called "subgame perfect."
This dynamic game is assumed to be Nash in the usual sense that each participating
agent assumes that the other agents will adopt a known and fixed intertemporal optimiz-
ing strategy (which will be similar to their own).
As a final comment, the game is also noncooperative. Several characteristics of an
overlapping jurisdiction fish stock define the harvesting by two or more countries as a
noncooperative game. First, noncooperation exists by definition, or the rules of the
game. Cooperative agreement may be sought, but there are transaction costs and perhaps
other noneconomic reasons for noncooperation. We will point out later that "coopera-
tion" could imply that some agents are better off and none worse off (if side payments
are allowed).
In summary, an individual fishing agent must formulate harvesting strategy with full
knowledge of the interdependencies of all harvesting and all effects upon the stock now
and its dynamic evolution. (The environment is not passive). In reality, the agent need
make only his decision about the current harvest rate at any one time, but an optimal
strategy will define not only his current harvesting rate but all future rates. [This last
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year, he would choose the same harvesting strategy from then onward at the same
rate as he has already chosen for those future years when formulating his current strat-
egy]
Several authors have developed models applying theories of dynamic games to such
transboundary fishing disputes. Munro (1979) provides a Coumot-Nash analysis as a
noncooperative game using discrete time and in a steady-state context. Lewis and Sch-
malensee (1982) provide analysis and properties of a cooperative solution that they show
to be Pareto optimal.
Levhari and Mirman (1980) model a common-property noncooperative game (or
"fish war") using a Coumot-Nash analysis, which they extend to include a Stackelberg
leader-follower. The LM model is dynamic and in discrete time. It suffers from a techni-
cal problem in that the model allows the fish stock to become zero, which is clearly not
in the best interests of the harvesting countries.
In this study we analyze a "fish war" using specifications of objective functions and
constraints common for this kind of model (see Hamalainen et al. 1983; Lewis and
Cowens 1982; Levhari and Mirman 1980 for similar specifications). Our model is quite
similar to a continuous analogue of the LM model. In contrast to the LM model, how-
ever, the fish population is always positive with or without human intervention.
We use an N-person noncooperative game structure to represent a renewable re-
source industry and subsequently develop a set of tractable closed-loop feedback strate-
gies that constitute a closed-loop feedback Nash equilibrium that is subgame perfect.' In
a closed-loop feedback equilibrium, each participant takes into consideration feedback
actions of all other participants. Since no commitment is made by participants, the
strategy of each participant is, in general, a decision rule depending on the current state
and time.
The Model
We develop this N-person game with subgame perfect solution using as illustration the
model of Levhari and Mirman (1980) for which they provide Coumot-Nash solutions.
The concepts we employ, however, are generally suitable to apply to many other similar
problems.
We specify a biological rule of growth dynamics,
x(t) = ax(t) - x(t)b ln x(t) (1)
where x(t) stands for the quantity of resource at time t.'' One can easily observe that
exp(a/b) is a natural steady-state and for any positive initial stock size, future stock size
will never be negative.
The number of participating agents (nations or fishermen) is N > 2 and agent i will
choose his harvesting effort Wj such that
Ci(t) = Wi(t) x(t) (2)
where Ci(t) is the amount of fish harvested at time t by agent i and Wi(t) is the amount of
effort applied.' Hence, equation (2) can be viewed as a production function of the
Schaefer type common in the fishery literature.*
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N
a - ^ Wi) ix - xblnx (1')
j-i /
Once again, one can observe that given a positive initial value of x, the stock size is
always positive irrespective of the magnitudes of a, N and Wj's'
Following LM, we express the utility of agents in logarithmic form (as do Kaitala et
al. 1985):
Ui(Ci) = Ui(WiX) = aj ln WjX for i = 1, 2, . . . , N
0 < Wi < Wi (3)
where aj is a constant.
We assume this to be a finite horizon game to be played within time te[O,T] (where T
can approach infinity) and each agent has its own discount rate, r;, and we assume that
each participating agent would get an equal share of the remaining stock. Since the
objective function of agents is in logarithmic form, the terminal valuation of resource
stock is in the form:
e-^i^Si ln(x(T))/N for i = 1, 2, . . ., N
where Si is a nonnegative constant.
Therefore, each agent faces the problem:




X = f a - ^ Wj Ix - bx ln X
V j-1 /
x(0) = xo (4)
A set of control strategies w* = [wf (t,x), wf (t,x), . . . , w* (t,x)] provides a closed-
loop feedback Nash equilibrium if there exist functions satisfying the following condi-
tions:
V'(t,x) = [J ai ln(Wi* (s, x*(s))x*e-V ds + Q-'-^S-, ln (x* (T))]
>[( ai ln(Wj (s, x'(s))Xi-V ds -1- e'^^Si ln(x' (T))]
V'(T,x) = e"V [Si ln(x(T)) - Si ln N] for i = 1, 2, . . . , NHarvesting Transboundary Fish Stock 61
where on the interval [0,T]
i*(s) = (a - |]wf (s,x*) jx* - bx* In x*
x'(s) = (« - ]S <(s,x') - Wi(s,x') j x' - bx' In x' (5)
Note that strategies W|*(t,x), . . . , wi5(t,x) = w* are rules that depend on time and
the current state x(t) and hold for any subgame interval [t,T], 0 < t < T.
Using Bellman's technique of dynamic programming, one can show that w* must
satisfy the following system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations:
_V; = Ep L In (Wi(t)x)e-V + v' |^a - |; wf(t,x)
11
- b In X XI
j-i
x(T)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N (5')
In general, the set of tractable closed-loop feedback strategies w* is difficult to
obtain. To date there are only a few classes of differential games with explicitly solvable
feedback solutions.* Game structure (4) does not appear to belong to any known class of
differential games that provides a tractable solution,' Our approach in this case is to
provide a transformation of variable, which, in fact, allows us to find an open-loop
solution. This open-loop solution is shown to qualify as a closed-loop solution.
To accomplish this solution, we propose the following transfomiation:
Let y = In X (6)
- by (7)
The objective functional of agents expressed in terms of the transformed variable y
now becomes
max In W; + Si,y)e-''' ds + e"'!^ Si[y-ln N] (8)
First we deduce a Nash equilibrium in open-loop controls. Let .X = {X,(t),
X2(t), . . . , XnCt)} be the set of costate variables for the set of N agents. The Hamilto-
nian of agent i can be expressed as:62 C. Plourde and D. Yeung
(ai In Wi + aiy)e-V -I- Xi(t)( a - J Wj - by
j-i
(9)
A set of control strategies H'*(t) = {wf(t), W2*(t), . . , , w;J(t)} constituting an open-
loop Nash equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions:
i) y* = a - ^ wf - by
j-i
H'(y*, w*, \, t) > H'(y*, Wi, Xi, t) for i = 1, 2, .
where w^ = {Wi*(t), W2*(t), . . . , Wi*_,(t), w^t), w,* ,(t), . wiJ(t)}.
An interior solution implies:




= \ for i = 1, 2, . . . , N
+ b\ for i = 1, 2, . . . , N
e-'i'" for i = 1,2, N (10)
The adjoint equations (lOiii) are linear differential equations that are independent of
the state variable and Wi* is chosen independent of the state variable. Hence, this game is
state-separable. The open-loop solutions of state-separable games are indeed closed-loop
feedback solutions.'" Hence, the set of control strategies wf' that satisfies (10) is a set of
closed-loop feedback strategies.
Solving the set of linear differential equations in (lOiii) with terminal conditions
(lOiv), we obtain a closed-form solution for the co-state variables of each agent.
b -1-
b -I-
fori =1, 2, . . . , N (11)
Substituting (11) into (lOii), with Wj = aj/X, e '•' we obtain the game strategy Wi*(t) of
agent i time te [0,T]. Observe that this strategy, expressed in terms of fishing effort of
agent i at time t, can be substituted into the catch function (2) to give the catch of agent i





Since Si represents agent i's share of the stock remaining at the terminal date, ai
represents the intensity of his preferences and r, his discount parameter, we observe that
he will decrease his effort over time faster if either his share Sj is large relative to his
utility intensity parameter ai, or his rate of time preference ri is large.Harvesting Transboundary Fish Stock 63
In the extreme case where Si = 0 he has no incentive to slow down his harvest rate.
Alternatively, as aj — 0 or ri — oo he will prefer to delay harvesting in order to achieve
a larger "bequest" at the terminal time. Differentiating Wi*(t) with respect to time yields:
vvf(t) ^—-, y (12)
Ai
Hence, harvesting effort is decreasing over time for each agent if and only if S, > ai/
b -I- ri. Moreover, one can show that for any nonnegative value of Sj, Xi(t) is nonnegative
in the time interval [0,T].
Next, we extend the game to a situation where T approaches infinity. In a game of
infinite horizon Si, which represents a net evaluation is assumed to be zero for i = 1,
2, . . . , N. Using current-valued Hamiltonians and letting X = (X|(t), X2(t), . . . XN(t))
be corresponding costate variables, we have.
H' = e'i'Hi = ai In Wi -f- "["",?"'""']
where
7i = e'i'Xi fori = 1, 2, . . . , N (13)
Conditions (lOii) and (lOiii) are replaced respectively by
and
ii = r,r, - a, -h b7i fori = 1,2, ... ,N (14)
In steady state 7i has to be equal to ai/(b + r^. One can observe that with T
approaching infinity and S| equalling zero it follows that
lim Xi(t) 2i— e-V for i = 1, 2, , . . , N (15)
'-" b -I- ri
and by definition Xi(t) = eV Xi(t) = a^Q) + r,).
From the necessary conditions we obtain a harvesting rate for agent i
Wi*' (t) = b -I- ri for i = 1, 2 N (16)
Hence, agents with higher discount rates will harvest at higher rates. In the next section,
it will be possible to show that the above harvesting rate is too high from a social point
of view.
Substituting Wi** for i •= 1, 2, . . . , N into the growth dynamics equation, we obtain64 C. Plourde and D. Yeung
a - 2 (b + rj) - by
j-i
(17)




or in terms of the original stock variable
X* = exp (19)
The steady-state harvest of agent i can now be expressed in terms of the original specifi-
cation as
= (b -H fj) exp
The steady-state stock, which is always positive in size, results as the solution of the
original dynamic non-cooperative game (with infinite horizon).
It is easily demonstrated that (19) represents the appropriate steady-state by direct
substitution into (1')
a - x - xb ln X
where from (16) Wj = b -I- rj in a steady state. If folllows that x = 0.
To further demonstrate the optimality of wf =• b -I- r; for agent i, suppose instead he
chooses Wj = (b -I- ri(l + d{) for some 8, where other agents have wj* = b -I- rj. If the
appropriate catch rates given by (2) (5') for steady-state values, the difference between
the values of the objective function for choice wf with steady-state stock value x* and Wj
with steady-state stock value x* can be shown to be D = 6i(l -I- r/b) - ln(l -I- S,). This
difference is minimized when 5, = 0 hence W; = b -I- r, is optimal. The steady-state
value X* wUl be compared next to the optimal stock under common jurisdiction.
Combined Maximization
In this section as in Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Lewis and Cowens (1982) we
compare the results of the previous section to those that are based on combined efforts of
agents to maximize the discounted sum of the objectives of all agents. In order to avoidHarvesting Transboundary Fish Stock 65
the unresolved issue of utility comparability, we assume that a, ln(WiX) represents the
instantaneous net revenue for agent i. The Hamiltonian to be maximized is:
H = I) (aj ln wj -H ajy)e-Y -I- Q^a - Wj - by j (20)
Necessary conditions for an optimum control w* = {wf(t), wf(t), . . . , wiJ(t)}
are:
N
y* -I- a - ^ Wj - by*
j-i
H(y*, w*, Q, t) > H(y*, w,, fi, t)
which implies
a; —e-V = fi for i = 1,2 , N
*
" +
fi(T) = I; Sje"? (21)
j-i
The costate variable can be solved explicitly from (21) as
where
j _ I
Comparing (22) with (11), we observe that 0(t) > Xi(t) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N in the
interval [0,T]. Hence, wfwill be lower in combined maximization. Similarly, as T
approaches infinity, ihe steady-state value of X(t) with combined effort is
which is larger than any single X|(t) in the case of individual maximization. The steady-
state harvesting efforts for combined maximization are:66 C. Plourde and D. Yeung
= -^ (b -I- fi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N (23)
j-i
The steady-state stock under combined maximization is:
a — b — > —
(24)
Comparing (23) and (24) with (16) and (17), one observes that in the steady-state,
harvesting effort is smaller while resource stock is higher with combined maximization.
For the sake of comparison, we assume that agents are identical (i.e., aj = aj and r; = rj
for i ^fc j) so that (23) and (24) become:
i-(b -h r) fori = 1,2, . . . ,N (23')
N
and
In terms of the original specification, the volume of catch for each agent in steady-
state under combined maximization is
wrexp(y*^) = i (b -h r) expf" ~ ^ "^ '^) (25)
whereas the corresponding volume of catch in steady-state under individual maximiza-
tion is
(b + r) exp (« - N^(b + r)^ (26)
One can verify that the expression in (25) is greater than the expression in (26).
Hence in the steady state, combined management leads to a higher catch for each agent.
Since production is influenced by the size of the fish stock, "proper" valuation of the
stock by combined decision making leads to a higher sustainable yield. However, al-
though the combined management solution is in aggregate more "profitable," it is not
always achieved and fish wars persist. This is easily explained if we consider other
aspects of importance in deciding on a sharing arrangement such as transaction costs.
Presumably, an agent would rather compete as above than accept an "unfair" share. (In
terms of standard language of game theory, we have shown the "usual" outcome that
cooperation would imply a Pareto improvement over a noncooperative solution if side
payments were allowed).Harvesting Transboundary Fish Stock 67
Finally, we depart from the assumption made above that the number of agents is
given, perhaps by legal rights, licenses, etc. Assume that there is a group of identical
potential participants and there is freedom of entry and exit. Each participant is required
to pay a sum, f, perhaps as an entrance fee or set-up costs to enter the game.'^ Thus
industry entry will require that
ii(ln Wi -I- y)e-'i'ds + Sie-'i'^y - f > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N (28)
Earlier, we showed that Wj is independent of y. Therefore, with more agents the
value of y at each time instance in the interval [0,T] will be lower and hence the volume
of catch will be lower. Thus since the left side of (28) is a decreasing function of N,
there exists a unique number of firms that satisfies (28).
If f, a licence fee were to be appropriately chosen, such as by the value [Q(t) - Xi(t)]
where a seasonal licence is allowed to vary over time, or by the above expression
evaluated in the limit as T — oo, then the market could determine industry size N
consistent with optimal stock size.
Conclusions
In this study, we presented a differential game model of renewable resource harvesting.
Specific functional forms are assumed. These forms are consistent with LM and other
authors and allow us to provide a closed form solution to illustrate the nature of the
solution. We share the suggesdon of Levhari and Mirman (1980) about the inadequacy of
exisdng technology to generate explicit results for more general models. Our model
differs from the LM model by introducing condnuous time and eliminates a technical
error they make by allowing agents to possibly exdnguish the resource that is clearly
nonoptimal. In this environment, we develop a closed-looped feedback Nash solution.
Its primary advantage is widely recognized to be the fact that it allows agents to take into
consideration complete feedback of other agents. Such games do not necessarily have
solutions, but in this case a soludon exists and we have derived in explicit form the
equilibrium strategies and steady-state level of resource stock. We also demonstrated in
our model that combined maximizadon generates potendally greater net revenue for
each agent as compared to individual game strategic maximization. This result is consis-
tent with the results obtained by Lewis and Cowens (1982) by Kaitala et al. (1985).
In terms of policy, it is apparent that having to engage in a "fish war" is inefficient
or wasteful in that the maximum potendal benefit of the resource stock is not exploited.
Hence, even if transactions are costly, cooperation is usually sought. One reason, how-
ever, that cooperadve soludons are slow in formuladon is that only those cooperadve
solutions that don't disadvantage either party are feasible. The prospects of "side pay-
ments" are usually unrealistic. Hence, bargaining for a best deal is difficult, and other
well-known aspects of game theory can occur. For instance, the "fish war" between
France and Canada over harvesting in the Grand Banks is unresolved and various threats
and counterthreats have resulted, such as a temporary impounding of a French fishing
boat by Canadian authorities. One interesting "side payment" that seems to be "unoffi-
cially on the bargaining table" is whether the Canadian armed forces adopt a French-
built submarine.
We described how the strategy of an agent engaged in a dynamic noncooperative68 C. Plourde and D. Yeung
game may appear. We have not analyzed the political environment that created the game
but simply described how it would be played.
It is interesting to observe, however, that there have been two highly publicized "fish
wars" in Canada in the past decade. The Canada-U.S. contest over the Georges Bank
resulted in a joint agreement that was perceived by some Canadians as unfavorable for
them, and the Canada-France dispute over the joint Newfoundland-St. Pierre/Miquelon
fishery, which is still unresolved but under negotiation. In the interim, we believe that
the modeling and dynamic solution we have provided reasonably describes current be-
havior.
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Notes
1. As an early example of "rent seeking," small settlements were soon "illegally" estab-
lished in Newfoundland generally by Basque fishermen.
2. International Commission for the North Atlantic Fishery.
3. "A Nash equUibdum is subgame perfect ... if the continuation of the decision rules
constitutes a Nash equilibrium when viewed from any intermediate (date, state) pair, i.e., if they
form a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game. Reinganum and Stokey (1981), p.
4. The specification (1) is the continuous analog of the discrete time growth function x,+, =
bx;" of Levhari and Mirman (1980); see J. B. Smith (1980) for derivation details.
5. The use of Wi(t) instead of Ci(t) (which is used in Levhari and Mirman 1980 model) as the
control variable enables us to avoid the problem of reaching negative stock sizes. Kaitala et al.
(1985) compare harvest rates q and harvesting effort Wj as control variables in their model, p. 605.
6. See, e.g., Clark and Munro (1976) for details of the Schaefer model.
7. In Levhari and Mirman's (1980) paper, an uncoordinated policy may lead to c, + cj > x
and consequently the game is undefined. Our specification is chosen to avoid this problem.
8. See Clemhout and Wan (1974), Leitmann and Schmittendorf (1978), Reinganum (1982),
Dockner et al. (1985), Jorgensen (1985), Yeung (1987, 1988).
9. In Clemhout and Wan (1985), a similar structure with stochastic shocks is developed.
However, the closed-loop feedback strategies obtained by them using Kushner's method applies
only in the case of an infinite horizon case. In particular, the equilibrium strategies in steady-state
when T approaches infinity developed in this paper converge to their strategies when stochastic
shocks are removed. See Plourde and Yeung (1987).
10. See Leitmann and Schmittendorf (1973) and subsequently, for a proof, Dockner et al
(1985).
11. Comparison of (23') and (16) suggest the obvious (trivial) limiting case of sole ownership
since equality will occur if and only if n = 1. Otherwise, for N > 1 the agent who is involved in a
noncooperative game will always harvest at a higher rate.
12. 'f is measured in the same unit as the objective function.
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